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Highlights 
We examine the relationship between dishonesty and selection into competition. 
Do honest or dishonest people enter competitive schemes more often? 
Competition increases dishonesty when participants are randomly assigned to schemes. 
With selection, those who are more dishonest select competition more often. 
*Highlights (for review)
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Abstract 
 
We conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants 
are paid according to their reported performance. Participants are paid according to a piece 
rate and a winner-take-all tournament and then select between the two schemes before 
performing the task one more time. Competition increases dishonesty and lowers output 
when the payment scheme is exogenously determined. Participants with a higher propensity 
to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition. However after selection, we find no 
output difference between piece rate and tournament. This is attributable to a handful of 
honest individuals who select competition.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important lessons from economics is that competition is beneficial 
because it is efficiency enhancing. A labor tournament, a democratic election or a marathon, 
all share the same goal: to maximize performance by rewarding the most productive worker, 
the most talented politician or the fastest runner. However, reality is not that simple. Firstly, it 
is often difficult, if not impossible, to measure actual output and contestants might be able to 
misrepresent their performance. Thus an employee may exaggerate her accomplishments, a 
politician may lie about her achievements and a sportsman may take performance-enhancing 
drugs. Secondly, participation in contests is endogenous. Some people choose to enter 
competitive careers, become politicians or professional sportsmen while others shy away 
from competition (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). The possibility of being dishonest, on 
the one hand, and the presence of selection on the other raise a number of relevant and 
interesting questions which we will address in this paper. First, are people more or less 
dishonest in competitive situations? Second, does competition actually improve performance 
when contestants can lie? Third, who is more likely to select into a competitive scheme, 
honest or dishonest people, and how does this selection impact on the effectiveness of the 
competitive scheme?   
Economists have shown theoretically that tournaments are beneficial because they 
increase production (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and some have also modeled sabotage and 
dishonesty in tournaments theoretically (e.g. Konrad, 2000; Curry and Mongrain, 2009). 
Empirical evidence supports some of these theoretical predictions (e.g. Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990). In this paper we use an experimental approach as it allows us to observe 
dishonest actions empirically, which can be difficult using field data. We present a real effort 
experiment in which participants perform a similar task under different payment schemes. 
Actual performance is not monitored and payment depends on self-reported performance. 
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Each participant performs the task three times. In the first two tasks subjects are paid 
according to either a piece rate scheme or a winner-take-all tournament in which they are 
randomly matched with another participant. After having experienced both mechanisms, each 
participant selects either the tournament or the piece rate as a payment scheme for the final 
task.  
We find that the tournament incentive scheme results in significantly higher 
dishonesty, but also substantially lower output as compared to the piece rate scheme. In our 
experiment, for a given performance, the tournament winner receives a higher payoff than in 
the piece rate scheme; while, on the contrary, the loser receives nothing. Thus, the higher 
opportunity cost of being honest in the tournament might explain the increase in dishonesty. 
This is despite the fact that there is evidence that individuals face a psychological cost of 
lying (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Gneezy et al., 2013). We refer to this as the 
increase in dishonesty due to the competition effect. This in turn can explain the decrease in 
output. Once an individual decides to lie, or to increase her level of dishonesty, the relative 
benefit of honestly produced output suddenly falls. Moreover, such benefit decreases even 
further if one expects others to lie. Thus we find that, when monitoring is not available, not 
only does competition increase dishonesty, but it can also damage performance. 
We then turn to the issue of selection, which represents the main research question of 
our paper. Who is more likely to choose the tournament over the piece rate? And what is the 
effect of letting people select the payment scheme? We find that dishonest subjects are more 
likely to select into tournaments. As a consequence, when participation in the contest is 
endogenous we have a doubly perverse effect. On the one hand, dishonesty increases as a 
consequence of the winner-take-all nature of the tournament, which we described earlier as 
the competition effect. A politician may lie to her electorate or a sportsman may use 
performance enhancing drugs because of the pressure of the winner-take all contest. On the 
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other hand, individuals with a higher propensity to lie are more likely to enter the contest, 
causing an even more pronounced level of dishonesty. This can be termed the selection effect. 
As they chose to compete, the politician and the sportsman are more likely than others to be 
dishonest. 
Finally, what is the effect of selection on output? Interestingly, at the selection stage, 
we find no difference in output between the piece rate and the tournament. This is attributable 
to a handful of honest individuals. While most honest subjects select the piece rate scheme, a 
few of them choose the tournament. Being honest, they do not consider lying as an option and 
thus, having opted for the contest, they work hard and produce high output. Hence, despite 
the low performance of dishonest individuals, overall output does not differ across the two 
schemes. This is an intriguing and encouraging result. While competition increases the 
amount of dishonesty it does not necessarily harm performance. This result however is 
subject to an important caveat, as it depends on the initial composition of the population and 
the fraction of honest people who are attracted by competition. 
A number of experiments on dishonesty and deception have been conducted in recent 
years.2 Gneezy’s   (2005)  seminal  contribution  considered a sender-receiver game in which a 
player can lie and thus increase her payoff at the expense of her opponent. His main finding is 
that, on average, individuals are averse to lying when this leads to a small increase in their 
own payoffs but a substantial reduction in others’ payoffs. 3  Mazar et al. (2008) and 
Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) also find evidence of aversion to lying but in individual 
decision-making tasks (although neither observe individual lying behavior but instead rely on 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Cappelen et al., 2013; Battigalli et al., 2013; Gino et al., 2013; Ploner and Regner, 2013, 
among others. 
3  Several subsequent studies have also used the sender-receiver framework to study dishonesty. See, for 
example, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Lundquist et al. (2009), Maas and 
Rinsum (2013), and Innes and Mitra (2013). 
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session level data). While lying does occur it is less than the full extent possible, which can 
be attributed to aversion to lying.4 
 The relation between dishonesty and payment schemes is the subject of only a limited 
number of recent experiments. Some studies focus on target-based schemes (Schweitzer et 
al., 2004; Cadsby et al., 2010)5 and team incentives (Conrads et al., 2011; Danilov et al., 
2013). Closer in spirit to us is a paper by Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010). Using the 
real effort task first employed by Gneezy et al. (2003), they compare a piece rate and a 
tournament with a focus on gender and ability. They find no difference in the overall 
proportion of those who cheat. Competition, however has an impact on  women’s   cheating  
behavior, though this is mainly explained by differing ability levels between the genders in 
the real effort task.6 Belot and Schroeder (2013) conduct a real effort experiment comparing a 
winner-take-all contest, a piece rate and a flat rate scheme with a focus on whether subjects 
simply misreport their performance or steal money. As no evidence of theft is found, the 
authors  conclude  that  subjects’  behavior  can  be  explained  by  social  norms,  but  not  by  other  
regarding preferences. Finally, Rigdon   and   D’Esterre (2012) also employ the matrix task 
introduced by Mazar et al. (2008). They compare a piece rate scheme with self-grading, a 
tournament with self-grading and a tournament in which subjects grade their opponent. Their 
main finding is that people are more willing to inflate their result than to down grade others.  
Last but not least, our experiment is related to the literature on sabotage (e.g., 
Harbring and Irlenbush, 2005, 2008, 2013; Carpenter, 2010), in which researchers have found 
that sabotage is more common in tournaments than in piece rate situations, leading to less 
                                                 
4These studies typically use students as subjects. In contrast, Abeler et al. (2014) use a representative sample 
and find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution, suggesting that people 
rarely lie. 
5 See also Gill et al. (2013) as an example of target-based schemes where bonuses are random. 
6 Gender differences in dishonest behavior have been reported by several researchers. Friesen and Gangadharan 
(2012), for example, find that in the matrix game men are not only more likely to be dishonest than women, but 
they are also likely to be more dishonest.  
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output. While sabotage is aimed at reducing the output of the other contestants, subjects in 
our experiment, in contrast, can only inflate their own performance. Sabotage is interesting 
and important to study, however there may be limited opportunities to harm others in the 
field.   Inflating   one’s   own   performance   on   the   other   hand   is   easier   to   engage   in   and   is  
commonly observed. We focus on this aspect in our research.  
None of the above papers explore the issue of entry into tournaments, which is instead 
the object of a vast literature on gender differences (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
2013; Gneezy et al., 2009) and contest design (e.g., Cason et al., 2010). Our paper builds on 
the above research on dishonesty and is unique in addressing selection into tournaments when 
there is an opportunity for individuals to be dishonest. We present an experiment with both 
within and between subject design features and measure dishonesty at the individual level. A 
within subject design allows us to identify   whether   incentive   schemes   alter   participants’  
honesty and explain who selects into tournaments. By varying the sequence of the payment 
schemes in a between subject design we eliminate the potential confounds created due to 
learning or behavioral spillovers. Our findings have implications regarding how financial 
incentives should be designed for managers, employees, politicians, and people in many other 
professions.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and 
procedures. Section 3 reports the results from the analysis of the data. Section 4 explains our 
findings and the distinction between the competition effect and the selection effect arising due 
to dishonesty. Section 5 discusses the implications of our results and concludes by suggesting 
avenues for future research.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
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All subjects participated in four tasks. The first task was an investment task, similar to 
the one discussed in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Gneezy et al. (2009). In this task each 
participant decided how much of their endowment of $AUD 5.00 to put into an investment. 
There was an equal chance that the investment would yield triple the amount invested or 
nothing. The outcome was decided at the end of the experiment by a flip of a coin. This task 
was   conducted   to   elicit   participants’   attitudes   towards   risk,   which   could   influence   their  
propensity to be dishonest or tournament selection decision.  
In Tasks 2-4 we use the matrix task devised by Mazar et al. (2008) to examine if 
participants are dishonest when they have an opportunity. In contrast to Mazar et al. (2008), 
we collect individual level data.7 One of these three matrix tasks was randomly chosen for 
payment at the end of the session. In each of the tasks, there were two stages. In the matrix 
stage, subjects were given a sheet of 20 matrices, where each matrix contained 12 three-digit 
numbers (e.g. 5.34). The task was to find a pair of numbers in each matrix that add up exactly 
to 10.00. A sample matrix is shown in Figure 1.8 However, the task was made more difficult 
because not all of the matrices have solutions, of which subjects were made aware. Subjects 
were given five minutes to solve as many matrices as possible. Once the five minutes were 
up, subjects were asked to count the matrices they have solved and take note of it. They then 
folded the matrix sheet and put it in a box, which would not be opened until everyone had left 
the laboratory. After this, in the reporting stage, subjects were asked to write down on a 
collection slip the number of solved matrices they would like to report. It was specified that 
the number reported would be used to determine their earnings in case that particular task 
was selected for payment. 
                                                 
7 Mazar  et  al.  (2008)  measure  dishonesty  at  the  group  or  the  session  level  as  they  do  not  collect  subjects’  matrix  
sheets. Friesen and Gangadharan (2012, 2013) also use this task to examine individual level differences in 
dishonesty. 
8 Experimental instructions are contained in the Appendix. 
Page 9 of 55
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
7 
 
This task allows us to measure the degree and existence of dishonesty at an individual 
level, in a situation where there is no plausible way of being detected or punished. There are 
several reasons why this task is useful to measure dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008). First, 
subjects consider that the outcome is predominantly effort related rather than IQ related.  
Second, subjects can readily evaluate their own performance – they know if they have the 
correct answer or not. This means that any dishonest gain can be reasonably interpreted as 
cheating, rather than as a genuine mistake.  
Tasks 2 and 3 differ only in the way the subjects were to be paid. In Task 2, the Piece 
Rate task, participants were told that they would earn $1 for each matrix they reported having 
correctly solved. In Task 3, the Tournament task, each participant was randomly paired with 
another person in the same session and their payment depended on their performance relative 
to that of their partner. If they reported solving more matrices than their partner, they would 
receive $2 per reported matrix, else they receive zero. 9  In order to maintain the same 
incentives across payment schemes, the tournament task has an element of piece rate as well, 
as in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Task 4 asked subjects to first select a payment option 
before they participated in the matrix task. They could choose between the Piece Rate scheme 
or the Tournament scheme, which would be applied to the number of matrices they reported 
solving in this task. If they chose the Tournament scheme, they would be randomly paired 
with another person who had also chosen this scheme in this task and, as in Task 3, they 
would be paid $2 per reported matrix if they reported solving more than their partner and zero 
otherwise. Participants therefore compete against the competitive performances of others, 
                                                 
9 In the case of a tie, the experimenter tossed a coin in front of the subject to determine the winner.  
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who had also selected competition.10,11 We chose to have a higher payoff in the Tournament 
as our main aim is to study selection into the two schemes and without this feature there 
would be no monetary motivation to enter the Tournament. Choosing double the payoff in the 
Tournament helps keep the expected value similar in the two payment schemes (as in 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).12  
After Task 4, subjects completed a questionnaire which collected both standard 
demographic measures as well as attitudes towards lying. They were then paid. All subjects 
received a $5 show up fee, payment from the investment task, and payment from one of the 
randomly chosen Tasks 2-4. Earnings ranged from AUD $5 to AUD $60 with an average of 
AUD $21.14 (approximately US $20). 
We conducted the tasks in two different orders. In the first order, subjects participated 
in the four tasks in the sequence explained above. In the second order, subjects participated in 
the Tournament task before the Piece Rate task. We varied the order of the payment 
mechanism to examine if subjects who were exposed to the Tournament first had different 
behavioral responses towards dishonesty than subjects who were exposed to the Piece Rate 
                                                 
10 This is different from the design adopted by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) in their seminal paper that has 
inspired several selection experiments. In their study, subjects who choose the tournament compete against the 
performance of other participants in the (previously run) piece rate scheme. While their design presents a 
number of advantages, we wanted to represent a more realistic situation in which, when selecting a tournament, 
an individual competes against the performance of others who also chose to enter the contest. 
11 If Task 4 was randomly chosen for payment the subjects were matched as follows. The subject drew a card 
from a box containing the personal ID numbers of all the other participants who had chosen the Tournament in 
the session. Her performance  was  matched  to  that  of  the  person  whose  ID  was  drawn.  The  matched  participant’s  
payoff remained unaffected. The subjects were informed of this process beforehand. This ensured that a random 
matching process could be maintained irrespective of an odd or even number of subjects choosing to enter the 
Tournament. A similar matching process was used if Task 3 was chosen for payment, except that the box 
contained the personal ID numbers of all participants in the session. 
12This equivalence in expected values assumes that subjects are a priori identical, which in the absence of any 
other information is the most natural assumption. 
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first.13 Moreover we were interested in documenting and controlling for whether exposure to 
one of them leads to spillover effects on dishonesty in the other task. 
All sessions were conducted at the University of Queensland. One hundred and 
nineteen subjects participated in the experiment, with approximately 30 in each session and 
half in each order. Each subject participated only once. Subjects were predominately 
undergraduate students and were drawn from different academic disciplines and broadly 
recruited across the university by email using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Although some had 
participated in other economics experiments, all were inexperienced in the sense that they had 
never participated in a similar experiment with any opportunity for dishonesty or one having 
identical payment schemes. Of the 119 participants, 55% were male. 
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated a seat in the experimental laboratory. 
Even though our procedures were non-computerized, the laboratory provided a convenient 
setting as the cubicles enhanced privacy and anonymity. Each of the subjects had a set of the 
general instructions on their desk, a faced down personal ID card and four sealed envelopes. 
The personal ID was reproduced on all matrix sheets, reporting collection slips and forms. At 
the beginning of each session an experimenter read the instructions aloud while subjects 
followed along on their own copy. Instructions for the next task were only given once the 
previous task was completed. There was no feedback given to subjects between tasks. There 
was a box for the matrix sheets kept at one end of the laboratory and subjects were asked to 
fold and put their solved matrix sheets in that box for Tasks 2-4. Three reporting boxes were 
also placed at the opposite end of the laboratory  from the matrix box, one for each of the 
Tasks 2-4, in which subjects were asked to put their collection slips reporting how many 
                                                 
13  Harbring (2010) finds that being exposed to different incentive schemes can change behavior, with 
participants sending more in a trust game after being exposed to a cooperative team setting as compared to a 
tournament setting.  
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matrices they had solved. The experimenters made it clear that they would not be touching 
the matrix box during the session and that only the relevant reporting box would be opened 
up depending on which task was selected for payment. Separating out the matrix solving and 
reporting stage (subjects were instructed to return to their desks to complete the reporting 
form after placing their completed matrix sheet in the box) and creating different boxes for 
the  sheets  helped  reinforce  the  fact  that  the  probability  of  subjects’  dishonesty  being  detected  
and their being punished or frowned upon was zero. Including the instruction and payment 
distribution time, sessions lasted between 90 and 120 minutes.   
 
3. Results 
In this section we present results that address our three research questions. Summary 
statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 1. 
3.1 Which Incentive Scheme Results in Greater Dishonesty? 
Recall that subjects had the opportunity to be dishonest by reporting to have solved 
more matrices than they had in fact completed. After all the experimental sessions were 
completed, we opened the matrix box and assessed how many matrices were correctly solved 
by each subject in each task. We then matched this with the relevant reporting slip to 
construct a measure of dishonesty in each task equal to the difference between the amount 
reported and the actual amount solved.14 For each subject we have three such measures; one 
for each of Tasks 2, 3, and 4. 
In addition to this measure of the magnitude of dishonesty in each task, we 
constructed two additional measures. First, a binary indicator of whether or not the subject 
                                                 
14 As mentioned before an ID number was written on each reporting slip and matrix sheet enabling them to be 
matched later. To enhance anonymity we randomly distributed these across desks so that no participant could be 
easily identified with a particular ID number. 
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was dishonest in a particular task. Second, a measure of the magnitude of dishonesty as a 
percentage of the maximum degree of dishonesty possible given the number of matrices 
solved (i.e., 20 – number of matrices solved). 
It is worth pointing out that the nature of the task is such that subjects should be able 
to assess the correctness of their own performance. Thus we are interpreting excess reporting 
as dishonesty rather than as a genuine mistake. 15  Later in this section we examine the 
robustness of our conclusions to using an alternative measure which categorizes “small”  lies  
as mistakes rather than deliberate falsification.  Also note that because not all matrices have a 
solution (only 10 in fact did), even the most proficient participant had ample incentive to be 
dishonest. 
In Table 2 we report these three measures of dishonesty for Tasks 2 and 3, both 
overall and disaggregated by treatment and order. We also report the magnitude of dishonesty 
conditional on it occurring. The table also reports p-values from non-parametric paired 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests of differences between dishonesty in the Piece Rate versus the 
Tournament.  Dishonesty in Task 4 is considered in the next section. 
The first section of Table 2 reports results pooled over order. For all measures of 
dishonesty, the Tournament leads to more dishonesty than the Piece Rate. In particular, there 
is a substantial increase in the proportion of liars from 45% in the Piece Rate to 63% in the 
Tournament. Conditional on lying, the size of dishonesty is approximately the same, leading 
to an overall increase in the magnitude of lying (4.22 versus 3.29). 
Disaggregating by order, the table shows that these results are stronger in the sessions 
that started with the Piece Rate, with significant increases in all three dishonesty measures 
when the Tournament is employed (Wilcoxon signed rank p-values<0.01). While the 
                                                 
15 Only two people erred on the negative side each reporting one fewer matrix than they had actually solved 
correctly. 
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direction of the effect is the same in the sessions that started with the Tournament, significant 
differences are only detected for two of the dishonesty measures (p-values<0.10) and not 
when dishonesty is measured as a percentage of the maximum possible lie (p-value=0.586). 
We find evidence of a substantial order effect whereby subjects who experience the 
Tournament first lie more in all categories for both incentive schemes. The difference is 
strongly significant for the Piece Rate, using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test to compare 
dishonesty when the Piece Rate comes first versus when it follows the Tournament task (p-
values of 0.004, 0.034, and 0.003 respectively, for size of lie, proportion of dishonest 
subjects, and percentage of the maximum possible lie). In the Tournament task, however, 
while experiencing the Tournament first leads to greater dishonesty, this difference is not 
significant (p-values of 0.146, 0.228, 0.151 respectively for size of lie, proportion of 
dishonest subjects, and percentage of the maximum possible lie, using Mann-Whitney rank-
sum test). Hence, the greater subsequent lying in the Piece Rate task when it follows the 
Tournament makes it harder to detect any differences across the payment mechanisms. The 
order effect suggests that the motivations for being dishonest, once evoked, can have 
spillover effects. This could be an important consideration in choosing payment mechanisms 
in organizations. 
To avoid the confounding implications of the order effect and present a cleaner 
comparison of the two incentive schemes we conduct between-subject tests of dishonesty in 
the first (matrix) task encountered. The results, reported in the first panel of Table 3, clearly 
show that not only do more people lie in the Tournament (nearly double the proportion), they 
also lie by a significantly larger amount (by nearly twice as much, and three times more for 
the percentage of the maximum possible lie measure). These results are illustrated in Figure 
2, which shows the distribution of lying in the first task encountered.  
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Figure 3 illustrates these results in a different way. The figure plots the number of 
correctly solved matrices on the horizontal axis with the number of matrices reported as 
solved on the vertical axis. Thus accurate reporting occurs along the diagonal. The size of the 
bubble reflects the number of observations at each coordinate. As is evident from the graph, 
in the Tournament many more observations occur above the diagonal line, including a 
number at the maximum report possible. There is also no apparent correlation between lying 
and being successful in the task. 
Finally we explore the robustness of our conclusion by adjusting our dishonesty 
measures for the possibility of genuine mistakes. As mentioned in the previous section, our 
measure of dishonesty assumes deliberate over-reporting on the part of subjects when the 
number of reported matrices exceeds the number actually solved. An alternative 
interpretation is that  many  of  the  “small”  lies  are  in  fact  (unintentional)  errors.16 In fact, the 
most common category, after a lie of zero, is a lie of one (16% of subjects in the Piece Rate; 
17% in the Tournament) thus this adjustment might affect our conclusions. To examine this, 
we construct an alternative error-adjusted measure of dishonesty where we recode lies of size 
one as errors if the subject never lied by more than one in either task. That is, only if a subject 
overstates by one in one task and zero in the other, is this classified an error. (No one lied by 
one in both tasks.)  The rationale is that if a person lies by one in one task but by seven in the 
other task, it seems less likely to be a mistake. Of the 20 people who lied by one in the 
Tournament, four lied by more than one in the Piece Rate, and of the 19 people who lied by 
one in the Piece Rate ten lied by more than one in the Tournament. 
                                                 
16 A number of factors in fact mitigate this view. First, if it is an error, we would observe some under-reporting 
as well. However under-reporting is virtually non-existent (2 out of 119 subjects underreported in one task).  
Second, the task we use allows for self-checking and thus the line between deliberate carelessness and deliberate 
falsification is a murky one. Third, in some pilot sessions we actually checked the matrix sheets during the 
session and found very few errors (1 out of 16 subjects). Nevertheless since small lies are commonplace we 
examine the robustness of our results. 
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First consider the overall (pooled) results, as well as disaggregated by order (i.e., as in 
Table 2). Using this error-adjusted measure, differences in the overall results and when the 
Piece Rate came first remain strongly significant (i.e., the Tournament leads to greater 
dishonesty than the Piece Rate). However, when the Tournament comes first the size of lie 
and proportion of dishonest subjects in the Tournament is no longer significantly different 
than in the Piece Rate (p-values of 0.17 and 0.16 respectively, Wilcoxon signed rank test). 
Next consider whether the cleaner, first task, results are also robust to this alternative 
definition of dishonesty. In their first task, 21 people over-reported by one matrix, but nine of 
these lied by two or more in their second task, thus only 12 were counted as errors in the 
adjusted measure. The error-adjusted averages are shown in the bottom panel of Table 3 
along with the relevant p-values. They show that the main result that dishonesty is higher in 
the Tournament is robust to a different interpretation of small lies. 
To further analyze dishonest behavior, we classify subjects into one of the four 
following categories, based on their behavior in the two incentive schemes: 1): subjects who 
lie in both the Piece Rate and the Tournament (AlwaysLie); 2) subjects who lie only in the 
Piece Rate (LiePRonly); 3) subjects who lie only in the Tournament (LieTonly); and 4): 
subjects who lie in neither task (NeverLie). Table 4 shows the proportion of subjects falling 
into each category using the raw measure of lying and then the measure that adjusts for 
“small”   lies   as   errors.   The   table   shows   that   around one-third of subjects always lie, while 
very few people lie only in the Piece Rate. A larger proportion lies only in the Tournament 
(27% using the raw data, 13% using the error-adjusted measure). Subjects in this category 
may   feel   compelled   to   lie   to   compete   against   partner’s   dishonesty.   This  motivation   is   not  
relevant for people in the LiePRonly category. Hence subjects in the AlwaysLie and 
LiePRonly category can be thought to be relatively more dishonest while those in the 
NeverLie and LieTonly categories can be classified as relatively more honest. 
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We also conducted regressions to control for possible differences in demographic 
factors such as gender and risk preferences, both of which may affect the decision to be 
dishonest. Using dishonesty in the first task as the dependent variable we ran several different 
models controlling for demographic differences. While the estimated coefficient on the Piece 
Rate indicator is significantly negative in all specifications, confirming the non-parametric 
results of less lying in the Piece Rate, none of the demographic controls are significant, so we 
do not report the regressions here. 
 
In summary, our first result can be stated as follows: 
Result 1: Tournament incentives lead to more dishonesty than Piece Rate incentives: not only 
do more people lie, they also lie by a greater amount when they are dishonest. This is 
observed irrespective of whether we pool the two order sequences, examine them separately, 
only focus on the first task participants experience, or if we adjust the measure of dishonesty 
for possible errors. 
 
3.2 Does Competition Actually Improve Performance When Participants Can Lie? 
We have demonstrated how the Tournament payment scheme has the perverse effect 
of increasing dishonesty. Nevertheless this scheme may still be beneficial if output is 
increased. After all, greater output is one of the advantages of competitive incentive schemes.  
Recall that each matrix sheet contained 20 matrices but only 10 were in fact solvable. In both 
tasks, the number of correctly solved matrices ranged from zero to nine. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of output in the first (matrix) task disaggregated by incentive scheme. The figure 
shows a clear right shift in the distribution in the Piece Rate scheme. The modal output in the 
Tournament is two correctly solved matrices versus four in the Piece Rate. Also, zero output 
is more common in the Tournament. 
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In Table 5 we report the average number of matrices solved. As is clear from the 
table, output is significantly lower in the Tournament across all measures (pooled, by order, 
and also focusing on the first task). Thus not only does the Tournament lead to greater 
dishonesty but it also results in significantly less output. Regression analysis, using the output 
in the first (matrix) task as the dependent variable corroborates that the number of matrices 
solved correctly is significantly higher in the piece rate task. None of the demographic 
variables have any consistent explanatory power.17  
Table 6 reports the number of matrices solved by subjects in the first task they 
participate in, disaggregated by subject type. The number of matrices solved is significantly 
higher in the Piece Rate for subjects who never lie and for those who only lie in the 
Tournament irrespective of whether subjects are classified using the raw or the error adjusted 
measure. The Tournament therefore induces the relatively more honest types (those who 
never lie or who lie only when compelled to in the Tournament) to produce less output.  
 
Our second result can be summarized as follows:  
Result 2: Output levels are significantly lower in the Tournament as compared to the Piece 
Rate. Honest types are more likely to have lower output in the Tournament.  
 
3.3 Selection into Tournaments 
In this section we examine behavior in Task 4, beginning with the analysis of the 
Tournament entry decision. In the previous tasks, the payment schemes are given to the 
participants, whereas in this task participants can choose the payment mechanism. We will 
refer to these as exogenous and endogenous mechanisms.  
                                                 
17 These results are available from the authors, but not reported in the paper to save space. 
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Various individual characteristics are likely to affect selection, such as the 
psychological cost of lying (see Gneezy, 2005), ability, demographic characteristics, 
performance in the specific task, as well as beliefs about the honesty of others. While for each 
one of these features in isolation it may be possible to predict whether they encourage or 
discourage entry into tournaments, this task becomes exceedingly complicated when we 
consider all these factors jointly. In this section therefore we look for empirical evidence 
pertaining to the importance of these factors. 
 
3.3.1 Determinants of Entry Decisions 
We first examine whether dishonest people are more likely to select into the 
Tournament payment scheme. Of those who always lie 40% choose the Tournament scheme, 
compared with only 24% of those who never lie, providing suggestive evidence that the 
answer is yes. About two-thirds (66%) of subjects choose the Piece Rate, while one-third 
choose the Tournament. Men are significantly more likely to choose the Tournament (46% of 
men versus 21% of women; p-value=0.004, Mann-Whitney rank sum test). Those choosing 
the Tournament are less risk averse as measured by a greater amount invested in Task 1 (3.94 
versus 3.45; p-value=0.051, Mann-Whitney rank sum test). While these results are as 
expected, they suggest the importance of controlling for demographic factors when assessing 
how dishonesty affects the selection decision. 
Thus we present results of Probit regressions where the dependent variable is an 
indicator of choosing the Tournament in Task 4 (TChoice). The regressors of primary interest 
are four measures of dishonesty (included one at a time): an indicator that equals one if a 
subject always lies (AlwaysLie), an indicator of lying at least once in Tasks 2 and 3 (EverLie),  
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and indicators of lying in the Piece Rate (LiePR) or the Tournament (LieT) respectively.18 We 
also include the following control variables: an indicator of participating in the Piece Rate 
task first (PRFirst), gender (Male), the amount invested in Task 1 as a proxy for risk 
preferences (Invested), an indicator of whether the subject studies economics or business 
(EconBus), and an indicator if the subject is locally born (LocalBorn). Standard errors are 
clustered by session. The coefficient estimates for the four separate models are reported in 
Table 7. 
The following results are apparent from the table. First, those who are dishonest in the 
earlier tasks are more likely to select the Tournament in Task 4. The coefficient on dishonesty 
is significantly positive for all four measures. The magnitude of the effect varies from 9 
percentage points (LiePR) to 16 percentage points (EverLie). Given that on average 33% of 
subjects choose the Tournament, the effect is substantial: a 27%-48% increase depending on 
which measure of lying is used. Second, only one control variable is consistently significant: 
men are significantly (at the 10% level) less likely to choose the Piece Rate. No other 
variables are significant, although Invested (the measure of risk preference) has the expected 
positive sign. The variable capturing the order in which subjects participated in the tasks 
(PRFirst) is not significant.19 
                                                 
18 Note that these four measures differ from the four mutually exclusive categories that we divided subjects into 
in Table 4 as our purposes are different. Here we construct different, plausible, measures of dishonesty and 
examine if they predict entry decisions. Clearly AlwaysLie is the same, while EverLie is the inverse of NeverLie. 
19 Alternative specifications in which the different type classifications are employed as dummy variables yield 
similar results, with subjects who always lie 17 percentage points more likely to enter the Tournament than 
those who never lie. These specifications are available from the authors. Regressions using the magnitude of 
dishonesty in either the piece rate or the tournament as the measure of dishonesty are statistically insignificant 
(though the point estimates have the expected sign), suggesting that the distinction between honest and 
dishonest is more important than how dishonest one is. We also included additional control variables such as 
age, GPA, year level, income, and performance in tasks 1 and 2 but they are never significant, thus we report 
only those regressors that seem most relevant. In additional specifications we examined whether performance in 
the previous tasks has a non-monotonic relationship with the tournament entry decision. The performance 
variables do not have a statistically significant impact.    
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In Table 8 the estimated coefficients from regressions using the error-adjusted 
measure of dishonesty are reported. For brevity, only the coefficient on the dishonesty 
variable is reported, with other control variables included as in Table 7 with similar results. 
As the table shows, selection into the Tournament is more common among those who always 
lie and among those who lie in the Piece Rate. Since very few lie only in the Piece Rate (3%), 
these two categories essentially coincide. We find a significant link between dishonesty in the 
Piece Rate task and selection into the Tournament as well as between subjects who always lie 
and the selection decision.  Perhaps lying in the Piece Rate provides a more accurate measure 
of  “inherent  dishonesty”  versus  “feeling compelled”  to  lie  in  the Tournament (because of the 
pressure of competition). The relatively more dishonest subjects (classified as mentioned 
above, as those who always lie and those who lie in the Piece Rate) are more likely to enter 
the tournament. 
At the completion of Task 4, subjects were asked an open-ended question about why 
they chose a particular incentive scheme. Two research assistants, both postgraduate students, 
independently coded these responses into the eight (non-mutually exclusive) categories 
shown in Table 9. Neither assistant was familiar with the purpose of the experiment or any 
decisions made by the subjects during the experiment. To assess the reliability of the coding 
we  computed  Cohen’s  Kappa  (Cohen,  1960;;  Krippendorff,  2013), which accounts for the fact 
that agreement between the coders might occur by chance.20 Landis and Koch (1977) suggest 
that  values   above  0.60   show  “substantial   agreement”,  while   those  between  0.40-0.60 show 
“moderate  agreement”. Thus  for  all  categories,   except   for  “dislike  of  competing”  reliability 
appears high. Risk and return were mentioned the most often, followed by expressions of 
confidence  or  lack  in  one’s  task  ability,  and  dishonesty  inclinations. 
                                                 
20 This measure is more informative than the more common procedure of reporting the agreement percentage 
across coders. Cason and Mui (2014) use the Kappa statistic when coding chat content in an experiment. 
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Table 9 also assesses the link between these stated reasons and the actual selection 
decisions in Task 4. For example, those who think others are dishonest never choose the 
Tournament, while those who report that they were planning to cheat were significantly more 
likely to choose the Tournament than those who did not mention this, providing support for 
our results. 21 Those who consider themselves smart or good at the task always choose the 
Tournament, while those who consider themselves weak or of low ability always choose the 
Piece Rate. The risk related to the Tournament is a   significant   determinant   in   subjects’  
choices. Those subjects who state that choosing the Tournament is not very risky and has a 
big payoff, always choose the Tournament. The percentages reported are for one coder only, 
but are similar across coders, while the p-values are conservative and report only the larger p-
value of the two coders. There were no substantive differences across coders. 
3.3.2 Task 4 Dishonesty and Output 
Having demonstrated that dishonest people are more likely to select into the 
Tournament payment scheme in Task 4, we now determine what subjects do in Task 4 
conditional on their selection decision. Two-thirds (66%) of those choosing the Tournament 
lie in Task 4, while only 59% of those choosing the Piece Rate do. The magnitude of lying is 
also higher in the Tournament (5.6 versus 4.2), but neither difference is statistically 
significant. Of those who chose the Tournament, the relatively dishonest subjects exhibit a 
dramatically higher magnitude of lying as compared to the relatively honest ones (9.2 versus 
1.7,  p-value= 0.0001, Mann-Whitney rank sum test ) 
Table 10 shows the estimates from two Tobit models examining the determinants of 
the size of the lie in Task 4. The first model only includes an indicator that equals one if the 
                                                 
21 Of the 9% who stated that they would cheat, 80% chose the tournament. On the other hand, among the 
remaining 91% who did not state this reason only 30% chose the competitive scheme. 
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subject chooses the Tournament (TChoice) and an indicator that equals one if the subject 
participated in the Piece Rate task first in Tasks 2-3 (PRFirst). The second model 
specification controls for risk preferences and other individual specific characteristics as 
described earlier. The estimates from both models show that those who selected the 
Tournament payment mechanism in Task 4 lie by significantly more than those choosing the 
Piece Rate payment mechanism.22 There is some evidence that the subjects who experience 
the Piece Rate first lie less in this task (p-value <0.10). 
Now we turn our attention to the performance of subjects in this task. The average 
number of matrices solved by the 78 subjects who choose the Piece Rate is 4.26 as compared 
to 4.39 by the 41 subjects who choose the Tournament (this difference is not statistically 
significant). The standard deviation for the Piece Rate choices is lower than for the 
Tournament choices (2.12 versus 2.35), suggesting there is more variance of output in the 
Tournament.  
Table 11 presents a Tobit regression of the number of matrices solved in Task 4 as a 
function of the choice of payment scheme (TChoice), the number of matrices solved in the 
first task they encountered (Matrices2), and demographic factors (as defined earlier). To 
explore how subject type influences Task 4 output contingent on their entry decision, we also 
include interaction terms between two subject types, NeverLie and LieTonly, and TChoice.  
We chose these two types to interact with TChoice because our earlier analysis (see Table 6) 
showed that these relatively honest types reduced their output when the Tournament was 
imposed upon them, thus we are interested to see if this effect continues here.23 The results 
show that subjects who solved more matrices in the first task they encountered, also solved 
                                                 
22 In alternative specifications we included an interaction term between TChoice and dishonest type and find 
support for the result from the non-parametric tests that the size of the lie is significantly higher for the relatively 
dishonest subjects who choose the Tournament.   
23 The order of the previous task (PRFirst) is not included in this regression as this variable is significantly 
correlated to the output in the first task (p-value = 0.0002). 
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more matrices in this task. Relatively honest types (NeverLie, LieTonly) who choose the 
Tournament in this task solve significantly more matrices than the more dishonest types 
(AlwaysLie, LiePRonly). This negative effect for the dishonest subjects is captured by the 
Tchoice variable, which has a coefficient that is marginally insignificant (p-value = 0.13). A 
joint test of significance indicates that the honest subjects who choose the Tournament have 
jointly a significantly higher output as compared to the dishonest subjects who also choose 
the Tournament (F-statistic (2,110) = 4.01, p-value = 0.02). Further, comparing the predicted 
output of honest subjects with dishonest ones shows that the linear combination of the output 
of the honest subjects is 2.08 matrices more than the dishonest ones (2.64 matrices from the 
linear combination of coefficients estimate minus 0.56 matrices solved by the dishonest 
subjects who chose the Tournament). The estimate from the linear combination of 
coefficients test is significantly higher, with a p-value = 0.006.  
The finding that honest subjects produce higher output in the Tournament indicates 
that, when subjects are allowed to select into an incentive scheme, then some of the honest 
ones produce a higher output after choosing the Tournament. In contrast, in Section 3.2 we 
found that the relatively honest subjects produce significantly lower output when the 
Tournament is exogenous, resulting in lower output levels in the Tournament. Hence, 
choosing to compete can lead to different output levels as compared to being compelled to 
compete. 
To explore this further, we compare the output of subjects when they are required to 
compete versus when they choose to compete. In aggregate, subjects who choose the 
Tournament  significantly increase output from 3.37 matrices being solved in the exogenous 
Tournament to 4.39 being solved in the endogenous Tournament (p-value=0.04, Wilcoxon 
signed rank test). Subjects who never lie solve 2.4 matrices on an average when compelled to 
compete compared to 5.0 when they choose to compete, a statistically significant difference 
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(p-value = 0.06, Wilcoxon signed rank test). The differences are not significant for the other 
types of subjects, although for LieTonly the difference in output is substantial in magnitude 
(3.8 when imposed and 5.1 when chosen, p-value = 0.21, Wilcoxon signed rank test). Hence 
this increase in output is driven by the relatively honest subjects who choose the Tournament 
in Task 4 and produce greater output.24 Thus this change in output from honest subjects is the 
reason why output is not significantly different between the Piece Rate and Tournament in 
Task 4.   
 
This leads us to Result 3. 
Result 3: Dishonest people are more likely to select into tournaments. Upon entry they lie 
more and their output is lower than honest people who enter the Tournament. However, due 
to the high output of honest people, overall output is not significantly different between the 
Tournament and the Piece Rate.  
 
4. Discussion 
The main findings of our paper are the following. First, we find evidence that people 
lie more in tournaments than in piece rate schemes. Second, when the payment scheme is 
exogenously given, output is lower in tournaments. Third, dishonest people are more likely to 
enter tournaments; however, in spite of this, when the payment scheme is endogenous there is 
no overall difference in output between piece rate and tournament. In this section we aim to 
explain these results. 
                                                 
24On the other hand, subjects who choose the Piece Rate do not show a significant increase in output from the 
exogenous Piece Rate (4.45 matrices solved) to the endogenous Piece Rate (4.25 matrices solved).Thus there 
does not appear to be a general learning effect over time which might confound our interpretation.  
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In order to understand our findings we must abandon the homo economicus paradigm 
and assume that people face a cost of lying (be it moral or psychological). This notion allows 
us to explain why some subjects are honest and why a substantial proportion of those who lie 
do not lie fully.25 Under this framework, the greater dishonesty encountered in tournaments 
can be interpreted as a result of the higher opportunity cost of being honest: while the 
tournament winner receives twice the reward per reported matrix as in the piece rate scheme, 
the loser receives nothing.26 We call this the competition effect. Such an effect in turn can 
account for the lower productivity we find in tournaments. This is because conditional on 
having chosen to lie to a greater extent than in the piece rate scheme, the relative benefit of 
correctly solving an extra matrix suddenly drops. Moreover, if one expects the others to act 
dishonestly the benefit drops even further. Carpenter et al. (2010) find a similar effect in a 
different setting related to sabotage and competition: the possibility of sabotage more than 
offsets the incentives of a tournament, leading to a lower output than under a piece rate 
scheme. On the contrary, Belot and Schroeder (2013) find that competition does indeed lead 
to more cheating, but also increases productivity. The between subject design of their 
experiment however makes it difficult to identify possible factors that determine differences 
in productivity and whether this is attributable to a certain type of subject. 
                                                 
25 Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) and Mazar et al. (2008) report similar results. In Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) 
only a minority of subjects are fully dishonest, around a third are honest and a large group choose an 
intermediate level of dishonesty. The authors interpret this as a desire to maintain a positive opinion of one self. 
Similarly, in Mazar et al. (2008) the magnitude of dishonesty is small, with most people cheating at 20% of the 
possible magnitude. Mazar et al. (2006) provide an explanation for this behavior based on the relationship 
between external and internal reward mechanisms. They speculate that below a certain threshold (i.e., for small 
lies) the internal reward mechanism may not be activated, thus the propensity to lie only depends on external 
cost-benefit considerations; beyond such threshold dishonesty becomes noticeable, the internal reward 
mechanism is activated and the propensity to be dishonest is independent of external considerations; finally, the 
material advantage from lying becomes so substantial that an individual acts in conformity to the homo 
economicus paradigm. 
26 In a related study, Rigdon and D’Esterre  (2012)  find  no  significant  difference  in  cheating  between  the  piece  
rate and the competitive scheme. However, this is most likely a consequence of a design difference, since, 
unlike us, Rigdon  and  D’Esterre  pay  the  same  amount  per  reported  matrix  in the piece rate as in the tournament. 
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Finally, we analyze the effect of selection on dishonesty and output. It turns out that 
those subjects who lie both in the piece rate and in the tournament are more likely to select 
the tournament than subjects who are honest under both payment schemes. Interestingly, the 
behavior of those who only lie in the tournament does not differ from that of honest 
individuals. This finding seems to suggest that the population can be divided into three 
categories, according to the individual cost of lying. At one end we have honest people:  they 
have a high cost of lying and choose to avoid competition. This is indeed rational since, at the 
other end, dishonest individuals, characterized by a low cost of lying, are more likely to enter 
competition. Finally, there is a third group defined by an intermediate cost of lying. They are 
only dishonest under the pressure of the contest but shy away from competition if given the 
option. Another way to look at this is to consider how subjects motivate their selection. While 
those who think the others will be dishonest choose the piece rate, subjects who plan to cheat 
select the tournament. As a consequence, when participation in the contest is endogenous we 
have a doubly perverse effect. On the one hand we have the competition effect as described 
above: because of the competitive pressure of the tournament subjects are more likely to lie. 
On the other hand, individuals with a higher propensity to lie are more likely to enter the 
tournament, causing an even more pronounced level of dishonesty. We call this the selection 
effect.  
In spite of the higher dishonesty induced by competition, we find no overall 
difference in output between those who enter the tournament and those who select the piece 
rate scheme. This seemingly surprising result is explained by the behavior of a few honest 
individuals. When the tournament is exogenous, honest participants put little effort into the 
task, possibly because they are discouraged by the prospect of others lying. Consequently, in 
the selection stage, most of them choose the piece rate scheme. A handful of them, however, 
select the tournament and produce a higher output than when the contest was exogenously 
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assigned. We can only speculate as to why these subjects decide to enter the tournament. 
They may be competitive individuals who, under a false consensus hypothesis, believe that a 
greater number of honest people will also choose this payment scheme. Whatever their 
reason, they behave very differently when they select the tournament than when this is 
imposed upon them. This makes sense: once an honest individual, who does not consider 
lying as an option, chooses the competitive scheme, the only rational thing for her to do is to 
work as hard as possible. Hence, despite the low productivity of dishonest individuals who 
select the tournament, total output is not different from the piece rate scheme. This is a very 
interesting and encouraging result. However, its robustness depends on the relative fraction of 
honest individuals who find competition to be sufficiently attractive. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Traditionally, introducing competition is argued to increase productivity. Evaluations 
about performance are however based on being able to accurately measure output, which is 
often difficult in the field. This provides an opportunity for individuals to be dishonest about 
their output. Using a real effort task and a within subject design we study individuals’ 
likelihood to be dishonest when they are paid for their performance via different payment 
schemes. Further, in most situations participants choose to enter competitive professions  
rather than being randomly assigned. An important contribution of this paper is that it 
addresses this selection; that is, whether dishonest people are more likely to self-select into 
competitive environments. 
Our results identify both a competition and a selection effect with respect to 
dishonesty. Dishonesty is higher when subjects are paid using a competitive tournament 
mechanism rather than a piece rate scheme. The performance measure or output is 
significantly lower in the tournament. This provides strong evidence that tournaments can 
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actually hamper performance, when there is a possibility that individuals are dishonest. The 
selection stage shows that dishonest subjects have a significantly higher propensity to choose 
the tournament scheme. This selection effect strengthens the negative effect of tournaments 
and leads to high levels of dishonesty. Selection however does not influence output as a few 
honest people choose competition and work hard.    
Our findings suggest that competition can in general lead to perverse effects. The 
incentive structure of contests and tournaments makes winning at all costs compelling for 
some people. This needs to be kept in mind when we design rules in several areas of society, 
such as winning in sports and politics, payments schemes in organizations and rewards for 
academic excellence. Institutional structures and management policies that are less easily 
manipulated by dishonesty and fraud would also increase interest and improve confidence in 
these important areas of society.  
While generalizing from the controlled environment of the laboratory to the naturally 
occurring environment requires careful thought, we believe that our results can provide 
insights into the impact of payment schemes on dishonest behavior and selection of dishonest 
people into areas where there is more opportunity to be dishonest. Our experiment utilizes a 
design that can measure the degree and existence of dishonesty at an individual level in 
situations where there is no monitoring and performance is self-reported. While we 
acknowledge that this is a stylized design, the controlled environment helps us understand 
several aspects of dishonest behavior in the field.  For example, in a recent paper, using a 
combination of laboratory and field methods, Hanna and Wang (2013) show that cheating in 
a laboratory task predicts fraudulent behavior by actual public servants in India. Dishonesty 
measures hence capture a meaningful propensity towards fraud and corruption. 
In future research it would be useful to explore other performance measures such as 
an objective standard or an improvement on own past performance, and how these measures 
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are influenced by dishonesty. A particularly interesting question would be the influence of 
these alternative measures on selection.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Lie2 Amount of lying in second task (first 
matrix task) 
3.41 5.95 -1 20 
Lie3 Amount of lying in third task 4.09 5.98 0 20 
Lie4 Amount of lying in fourth task 4.66 6.34 -1 20 
Matrices2 Number of matrices solved in second task 
(first matrix task) 
3.48 2.26 0 9 
Matrices3 Number of matrices solved in third task 4.16 2.43 0 9 
Matrices4 Number of matrices solved in fourth task 4.30 2.20 0 9 
Report2 Number of reported matrices in second 
task 
6.89 5.66 0 20 
Report3 Number of reported matrices in third task 8.25 5.93 0 20 
Report4 Number of reported matrices in fourth 
task 
8.97 6.10 0 20 
PRFirst Indicator if undertake Piece Rate task 
first 
0.50 0.50 0 1 
AlwaysLie Indicator if lie in both Tasks 2 and 3 0.36 0.48 0 1 
LiePRonly Indicator if lie only in Piece Rate task 0.09 0.29 0 1 
LieTonly Indicator if lie only in Tournament task 0.27 0.45 0 1 
EverLie Indicator if lie in either Task 2 or 3 or 
both 
0.72 0.45 0 1 
NeverLie Indicator if lie in neither Task 2 or 3 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Lie in PR Indicator if lie in Piece Rate Task 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Lie in Tour Indicator if lie in Tournament Task 0.63 0.48 0 1 
TChoice Indicator if choose Tournament in Task 4 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Invested Amount invested in Task 1 3.62 1.28 0 5 
Male Indicator if male 0.55 0.50 0 1 
EconBus Indicator if studying economics, business 
or commerce 
0.62 0.49 0 1 
LocalBorn Indicator if born in Australia or New 
Zealand 
0.46 0.50 0 1 
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Table 2: Average Dishonesty Measures by Payment Scheme and Task Order 
 N Size of Lie Proportion 
Dishonest  
Size of Lie if 
Dishonest 
Percent 
Maximum 
Possible Lie 
  Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Piece Rate 119 3.29 0.45 7.26 0.21 
Tournament 119 4.22 0.63 6.71 0.24 
p-value*  0.000 0.001  0.000 
      
  PR First PR First PR First PR First 
Piece Rate 59 1.42  0.36 4.05 0.09 
Tournament 59 3.05 0.58 5.29 0.18 
p-value*  0.000 0.006  0.000 
      
  T First T First T First T First 
Piece Rate 60 5.12 0.55 9.30 0.32 
Tournament 60 5.37 0.68 7.88 0.30 
p-value*  0.087 0.073  0.586 
* p-values from a paired Wilcoxon signed rank test (i.e., within-subject). Because some subjects lied in only one 
task the test could not be applied to the magnitude conditional on lying. 
 
 
Table 3: Average Dishonesty Measures in First Matrix Task Only  
 N Size of Lie Proportion 
Dishonest  
Size of Lie if 
Dishonest 
Percent 
Maximum 
Possible Lie 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Piece Rate 59 1.42 0.36 4.05 0.09 
Tournament 60 5.37 0.68 7.88 0.30 
p-value*  0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 
      
  Error Adjusted Error Adjusted Error Adjusted Error Adjusted 
Piece Rate 59 1.37 0.29 4.76 0.08 
Tournament 60 5.25 0.55 9.55 0.29 
p-value*  0.000 0.004 0.016 0.000 
* p-values from a Mann-Whitney rank sum rank test (i.e., between- subjects). 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of Subject Types 
 Always Lie LiePRonly LieTonly Never Lie 
Raw data 36% 9% 27% 28% 
Error adjusted 36% 3% 13% 48% 
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Table 5: Average Output by Payment Scheme and Order  
 Pooled PR First T First First Task 
Piece Rate 4.47 (2.34) 4.24 (2.21) 4.70 (2.44) 4.24 (2.21) 
Tournament 3.17 (2.23) 3.61 (2.31) 2.73 (2.07) 2.73 (2.07) 
p-value* 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.000 
The figures in the table are average (standard deviation). * From two-sided non-parametric tests; the first three 
columns report paired Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and the last column reports the Mann-Whitney rank sum test. 
 
Table 6: Average Output in the First Matrix Task Disaggregated by Subject Type 
Raw Measure Always Lie LiePRonly LieTonly Never Lie 
Piece Rate 3.38 3.20 5.22 4.30 
Tournament 2.74 3.67 3.00 2.00 
p-value* 0.208 0.848 0.015 0.003 
     
Error Adjusted Always Lie LiePRonly LieTonly Never Lie 
Piece Rate 3.38 4.00 6.20 4.06 
Tournament 2.74 5.50 2.67 2.52 
p-value* 0.208 0.221 0.009 0.008 
* p-values from Mann-Whitney rank sum tests. 
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Table 7: Probit Regressions of Entry Decisions, Marginal Effects Reported 
Dependent variable: TChoice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
AlwaysLie 0.099***    
       (0.042)    
     
EverLie  0.161**   
  (0.080)   
     
Lie in PR   0.092***  
   (0.034) 
 
 
Lie in Tour    0.139* 
    (0.077) 
     
PRFirst -0.038 -0.030 -0.036 -0.039 
 (0.114) (0.103) (0.111) (0.109) 
     
Invested 0.042 0.039 0.044 0.036 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.0317) 
     
Male 0.256* 0.254* 0.252* 0.260* 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.130) (0.139) 
     
EconBus 0.128 0.141 0.125 0.143* 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.084) 
     
LocalBorn -0.043 -0.065 -0.045 -0.057 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050) 
     
     
Observations 118 118 118 118 
Log 
likelihood 
-69.102 -68.352 -69.143 -68.541 
Standard errors in parentheses; clustered over session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Error-Corrected Dishonesty Coefficients in Selection Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dishonesty Measure AlwaysLie EverLie Lie in PR Lie in Tour 
     
Estimated marginal effect 0.099*** 0.016 0.092** 0.020 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.059) 
     
Dependent variable and other regressors are the same as in Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered 
over session. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 9: Reasons Stated for Task 4 Selection Choice 
   Percent Choosing 
Tournamentb 
 
Stated Reason for Task 4 
Choice 
Average 
percent 
stating 
reasona 
Cohen’s  
Kappa 
(reliability) 
of those 
who gave 
this reason  
of those 
NOT giving 
this reason  
p-
valuec 
Expect others to be 
dishonest 
9% 0.843 0 38% 0.017 
I plan to be dishonest 9% 0.843 80% 30% 0.033 
 Confidence in ability in 
matrix task 
11% 0.955 92% 28% 0.000 
 Perception of low 
ability or lack of 
confidence in ability in 
matrix task 
15% 0.766 6% 39% 0.008 
Preference for lower risk 55% 0.865 2% 72% 0.000 
Chance of higher return. 25% 0.843 100% 16% 0.000 
Preference for 
competing 
7% 0.594 100% 30% 0.002 
Dislike of competing 6% 0.325 0 39% 0.205 
a Percent is averaged across the two coders where disagreement occurs. 
b Illustrative values from one coder only. 
c p-value from a Mann-Whitney test comparing whether the proportion selecting the Tournament differs 
according to whether or not the stated reason was given. Reports the highest p-value across the two coders. 
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Table 10: Tobit Regressions on the Size of the Lie in Task 4 
Dependent Variable: Size of Lie in Task 4 (double censored 0-20) 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
   
TChoice 2.218*** 2.766*** 
 (0.477) (0.648) 
   
PRFirst -3.436* -3.526* 
 (2.000) (1.858) 
   
Invested  -0.236 
  (0.664) 
   
Male  -0.988 
  (1.125) 
   
EconBus  -1.045 
  (1.162) 
   
LocalBorn  1.747* 
  (1.034) 
   
Constant 3.060* 4.123*** 
 (1.827) (1.538) 
   
Observations 118 117 
Log 
Pseudolikelihood 
 
-291.448 
 
-287.504 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01    
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Table 11: Tobit Regression on the Output in Task 4 
Dependent Variable: Number of Matrices Solved in Task 4 (double censored 0-10) 
 
 
  
VARIABLES (1) 
  
TChoice -0.556 
 (0.366) 
  
Matrices2 0.453*** 
 (0.066) 
  
NeverLie*TChoice 1.354* 
 (0.689) 
  
LieTonly*TChoice 1.291** 
 (0.572) 
  
Invested 0.097 
 (0.109) 
  
Male -0.095 
 (0.630) 
  
EconBus 0.307 
 (0.328) 
  
LocalBorn -0.549 
 (0.487) 
  
Constant 2.410*** 
 (0.378) 
  
Observations 118 
Log PseudoLikelihood -243.151 
Pseudo R2  0.066 
Joint Test of Significance: NeverLie*TChoice & LieTonly*TChoice 
F(2, 110) 4.01 
Prob > F  
 
0.0208** 
 
Linear combination of coefficients: NeverLie*TChoice & 
LieTonly*TChoice 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
2.645 
(0.946) 
P-value 0.006*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1: Sample Matrix 
3.91 0.82 3.75 
1.11 1.69 7.94 
3.28 2.52 6.25 
9.81 6.09 2.46 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Lying in the First Matrix Task by Payment Scheme 
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Figure 3: Plot of Matrices Solved versus Reported Matrices in First Matrix Task 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Output in First Matrix Task by Payment Scheme 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Lying in Task 4 by Selection Choice  
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions27 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. Please read the instructions we give you 
today carefully. A clear understanding of the instructions will help you make better decisions 
and increase your earnings. All the money you earn is yours to keep and will be paid to you 
in private and in cash immediately after the experiment. If you decide to leave early, you will 
forgo your earnings, except for a $5 participation fee. 
 
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete four different tasks. None of these will 
take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment you will receive $5 for having 
completed the experiment. We will also pay you at the end of the experiment for task 1. In 
addition, we will randomly select one task from tasks 2-4 and pay you for that task. Once you 
have completed all the tasks we will determine which of the tasks 2-4 count for payment by 
rolling a standard die (if the number 1 or 5 or 6 is rolled the die will be rolled again). The 
method we use to determine your earnings varies across tasks. Before each task we will 
describe in detail how your payment is determined. 
 
Your total earnings from the experiment are: Your $5 for completing the experiment + 
Payment for task 1 + Payment for the randomly selected task from the tasks 2 to 4.  
 
Please turn your phone off or to silent mode now and place it on the floor, along with any 
other materials you have brought into the room. If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand.  Please do not consult with other participants in the room. 
 
All decisions that you make today are recorded only by an anonymous subject number 
and will only be used for research purposes. Your decisions will remain completely 
anonymous.  
 
Are there any questions before we begin? 
 
  
                                                 
27 These instructions are for the sessions where the Piece Rate task came first. In the sessions with Tournament 
first, the order of Tasks 2 and 3 was reversed. 
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Task 1 
 
We are about to begin the 1st task.  
 
In this task, you will be given $5. (No money will be given at this point. All actual payments 
will be made at the end of the experiment). You have the opportunity to invest a portion of 
this amount (between $0 and $5). 
 
The investment:  
There is an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the investment fails, you 
lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive 3 times the amount 
invested. 
 
How do we determine the outcome of the investment: 
After you have chosen how much you wish to invest, you will toss a coin to determine 
whether your investment succeeds or not. If the coin comes up heads, you win three times the 
amount you chose to invest. If it comes up tails, you lose the amount invested.  You will toss 
the coin when you come to collect your payment at the end of the experiment. 
 
Here are some examples: 
 
1. You choose to invest nothing. You will get $5 for sure.  
2. You choose to invest all of the $5. Then if the coin comes up heads, you get $15. If 
the coin comes up tails, you get $0. 
3. You choose to invest $3. Then if the coin comes up heads, you get $11 ($3 x 3 + $2 = 
$11). If the coin comes up tails, you get $2. 
 
Please fill in the amount that you would like to invest in the decision form.  
 
Do you have any questions? If you are ready, we will proceed.   
 
 
Form for Recording Decision for Task #1 
 
1. Amount that I wish to invest: _______________________ 
 
2. Reason for this decision: 
 
When you are done, fold the sheet in half, raise your hand and we will collect the 
form from you. 
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Task 2: Piece Rate Task 
 
Please do not open the envelope. Wait for experimenter instructions! 
 
On your desk is an envelope labelled TASK 2 in which you will find a sheet with 20 matrixes 
as the one below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In each matrix you should look for a unique set of numbers that sum up exactly to 10.  In 
some matrixes you may not have a solution. 
 
A matrix is solved correctly by finding two numbers that sum up exactly to 10. 
  
When  you  find  a  set,  circle  the  numbers,  and  mark  the  corresponding  ‘Got  It’  Box  below,  as  
in the example below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How will you be paid?  
 
For each matrix you report solving correctly, you will receive $1.00 (if this task is the one 
randomly selected for payment). 
 
You have 5 minutes for this task. 
 
  
3.91 0.82 3.75 
1.11 1.69 7.94 
3.28 2.52 6.25 
9.81 6.09 2.46 
3.91 0.82 3.75 
1.11 1.69 7.94 
3.28 2.52 6.25 
9.81 6.09 2.46 
Example 
 
Example 
 
Got it       
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Once 5 minutes are up you have to do the following:  
 
Matrix Stage 
 
1. Count the number of correctly solved matrixes and take note of this number. 
 
2. Fold your matrix sheet and place it in the Orange Matrix Box located near the 
entrance to the lab. This box will not be opened until after everyone has left the lab 
today. 
 
Reporting Stage 
 
1. Write down the number of solved matrixes you wish to report on the collection slip. Only 
this number will be used to determine your earnings in this task (if selected for payment). 
 
2. Take your collection slip and place it in the Record Box for this task located on the front 
desk.  If this task is selected for payment (from tasks 2-4) then we will open the Record 
Box to determine your earnings; otherwise the Record Box for this task will not be 
opened until everyone has left the lab today. 
 
 
 
 
Collection Slip for Task 2 
 
ID# 
 
I got _______ Boxes, which translates to $ _______ (=$1.00 per Box)  
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Task 3: Tournament Task 
 
Please do not open the envelope. Wait for experimenter instructions! 
On your desk is an envelope labelled TASK 3 in which you will find a sheet with 20 matrixes 
as the one below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In each matrix you should look for a unique set of numbers that sum up exactly to 10.  In 
some matrixes you may not have a solution. 
 
When  you  find  a  set,  circle  the  numbers,  and  mark  the  corresponding  ‘Got  It’  Box  below,  as  
in the example below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How will you be paid?  
 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another participant in the experiment, who is in 
the lab today, and your payment will depend on the number of matrices you report solving 
relative to that of the person whom you are paired with. 
 
 If you report solving more matrixes than the person you are paired with, you will 
receive $2 per reported matrix (if this task is the one randomly selected for payment). 
 
 If you report solving less than the person you are paired with, you will receive $0. 
 
 If you report solving exactly the same amount as the person you are paired with, we 
will toss a coin to determine whether you receive $2 per reported matrix, or receive 
$0. 
You have 5 minutes for this task.28 
 
                                                 
28 Instructions regarding the two stages are then repeated here. 
3.91 0.82 3.75 
1.11 1.69 7.94 
3.28 2.52 6.25 
9.81 6.09 2.46 
3.91 0.82 3.75 
1.11 1.69 7.94 
3.28 2.52 6.25 
9.81 6.09 2.46 
Example 
 
Example 
 
Got it       
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Collection Slip for Task 3 
 
ID# 
 
I got _______ Boxes, which translates to $ _______ ($2.00 per Box if I win or $0 if I 
lose).  
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Task 4: Payment Method Choice Task 
 
Please do not open the package. Wait for experimenter instructions! 
On your desk is an envelope labelled TASK 4 in which you will find another sheet with 20 
matrixes to solve, as in the previous tasks. 
 
In each matrix you should look for a unique set of numbers that sum up exactly to 10.  In 
some matrixes you may not have a solution.  
 
When  you  find  a  set,  circle  the  numbers,  and  mark  the  corresponding  ‘Got  It’  Box  below,  as  
in the example below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before you solve the matrices you need to choose which payment scheme you want 
applied to the number of matrixes that you report solving in this task. You can either 
choose to be paid according to the payment mechanism in the piece rate task or 
according to the payment mechanism in the tournament task.  
 
If this task is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are 
determined as follows:  
 
 if you choose the payment mechanism in the piece rate task, then for each matrix you 
report solving, you will receive $1.00.   
 
 if you choose the payment mechanism in the tournament task, you will be randomly 
paired with another participant who has chosen this payment scheme in the experiment 
today, and your payment will depend on the number of matrices you report solving 
relative to that of the person whom you are paired with. If you report solving more 
matrixes correctly than the person you are paired with, you will receive $2.00 per correct 
answer. If you report solving less than the person you are paired with, you will receive 
$0. If you report solving exactly the same amount as the person you are paired with, we 
will toss a coin to determine whether you receive $2 per correct answer, or you receive 
$0. 
 
You have 5 minutes for this task. 
 
  
3.91 0.82 3.75 
1.11 1.69 7.94 
3.28 2.52 6.25 
9.81 6.09 2.46 
Example 
 
Got it       
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Form for Task 4 
 
Q1. Which payment scheme would you like applied (check the appropriate box) 
 
  Option 1: The payment mechanism from the piece rate task 
 
  Option 2: The payment mechanism from the tournament task 
 
 
Q2.  Please briefly describe how you reached your decision of Option 1 or Option 2. 
 
 
Q3. If you chose Option 1, did your decision depend on the payment rate under 
Option 2? If so, what payment rate would have convinced you to choose Option 2? 
 
 
Collection Slip for Task 4 
 
ID# 
 
I got _______ Boxes 
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Payment 
 
We will now determine which of the tasks 2-4 to pay for. We will roll a standard die (if the 
number 1 or 5 or 6 is rolled the die will be rolled again); you will be paid for the task that 
corresponds to the number that comes up. 
 
If payment is for either of the paired tasks (i.e. the tournament task - task 3 or the payment 
method choice task – task 4), then we will further determine the number of matrixes solved 
by your randomly paired partner and pay you accordingly. To do this we will ask you to pick 
one card from the appropriate box on the front desk. The participant ID number on that card 
will be matched with you. 
 
